Nice little visual basic script that creates a sink to monitor failed RDP logons and adds them to a ban list for RDP.
Automatically Block RDP Brute Force Attack
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Tag Archives: security
Allow Inbound ICMP on Server 2008 R2
Here is how to enable ICMPv4 echo from the command line using netsh in Server 2008 R2
netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="ICMP Allow incoming V4 echo request" protocol=icmpv4:8,any dir=in action=allow
Example Screenshot
Enable ICMP from command line in Windows Server 2008 R2 using netsh
Windows Security Logon Types
Windows Security Logon Types
Event 528 and Event 540 are the Logon events. Event 528 is for all logons except “network” logons. “Network” logons are SMB/Microsoft-DS logons (i.e. connecting to a share). RDP, IIS, FTP logons, etc., are event 528 even though credentials may have come from over the network. All event 540′s are logon type 3.
Resource: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa380129.aspx
Resource: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394189.aspx
Resource: http://blogs.msdn.com/b/ericfitz/archive/2004/12/09/279282.aspx
| Logon type | Logon title | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | Interactive | A user logged on to this computer at the console. |
| 3 | Network | A user or computer logged on to this computer from the network. |
| 4 | Batch | Batch logon type is used by batch servers, where processes might run on behalf of a user without the user’s direct intervention. |
| 5 | Service | A service was started by the Service Control Manager. |
| 7 | Unlock | This workstation was unlocked. |
| 8 | NetworkCleartext | A user logged on to a network and the user password was passed to the authentication package in its unhashed (plain text) form. It is possible that the unhashed password was passed across the network, for example, when IIS performed basic authentication. |
| 9 | NewCredentials | A caller (process, thread, or program) cloned its current token and specified new credentials for outbound connections. The new logon session has the same local identity, but it uses different credentials for other network connections. |
| 10 | RemoteInteractive | A user logged on to this computer remotely using Terminal Services or a Remote Desktop connection. |
| 11 | CachedInteractive | A user logged on to this computer with network credentials that were stored locally on the computer. The domain controller was not contacted to verify the credentials. |
Google, MSN, Yahoo Search 7.7.7.0 Redirector Malware HiJack
Google 7.7.7.0 Redirect Malware, Virus, Spyware…
UPDATE (9/29/2011 9:15AM EST)
I have corrected the link to the 7770finder.exe file. This still detects the original strain of this piece of malware. To fully innoculate and protect yourself, I recommend downloading Malwarebytes’ Anti-Malware software: http://www.malwarebytes.org/. It’s FREE for personal use!UPDATE (1/19/2009 6:30PM EST)
I’ve been getting a lot of email questioning why my tool did not remove found infected files. This tool does NOT remove any infected files. It is up to you to remove them. This tool also does not support directory recursion; e.g., it ONLY scans %SystemDir% files, no subfolders. Sorry.
UPDATE (1/15/2009 12:51PM EST)
I have been able to successfully re-infect myself and I can confirm this is being distributed via PDF JavaScript as I was monitoring processes and my system32 directory as I visited a known vulnerable site. I also saw ~.exe process start up during my monitoring after I saw Acrobat.exe and acrotray.exe start up. Once infected, the processes (Acrobat, Acrotray) terminated.
To help prevent infection take the following actions:
Adober Reader: Disable Adobe JavaScript functionality (Edit -> Preferences, go to JavaScript entry and untick “Enable Acrobat JavaScript”)
Foxit Reader: Edit -> Preferences -> JavaScript (Uncheck the box)
Use NoScript Firefox Plugin
Tips thanks to Edvard and app103 over at DonationCoder
UPDATE (1/14/2009 11:17PM EST)
Update your PDF application and disable JavaScript.
UPDATE (1/14/2009)
Malwarebytes is able to detect the malware. Interestingly enough, it only detects it if it’s in c:windowssystem32drivers folder. I’m not sure what’s up with that. Update the applications to ensure you’re using the latest definitions. If you know of any other Spyware/Malware/AV software that is detecting this, leave a comment.AVG supposedly detects this threat (posted by: Peter Liu)
Please let me know of any other software that detects this.
[stextbox id="info" big="true"]Removal Instructions[/stextbox]
[stextbox id="download" big="true"]Detection Tool[/stextbox]
Here’s what I know about this lovely little malware that hijacks Google, MSN Live, and I’m sure a few other popular search engines by injecting javascript in the header:
1) Redirects searches to 7.7.7.0
2) Displays what appear to be normal results, but in fact are linked to many other malware centric sites
3) Kaspersky (as of this writing) is the only application to detect the presence of this malware on your PC (and yes I’ve tried Malware Bytes, Spybot S&D, AntiVir, SuperSpyware)
4) The culprit file resides in c:windowssystem32wdmaud.sys and should be removed, or renamed. Don’t remove the file from c:windowssystem32driverswdmaud.sys.
5) After deleting/renaming the file, restart your browser(s) and you’ll be OK. Note: This affects IE and FF, I have not tested Opera, Netscape or Safari.
Here’s an example screenshot of what Google results look like when you are infected. Notice the Google links (green links) on the results page.
Search results when infected with wdmaud.sys variant.What I’d like to know is what that file has to do with the browser. The WDMAUD.sys file (the real one) deals with Windows High Definition Audio. Could this file have been placed there via Flash vulnerability? I know I was on YouTube the night prior to me being invaded.
I ran ProcessMon from SysInternals and saw that Firefox and IE both called for wdmaud.sys but in the c:windowssystem32 directory, not in the drivers subfolder. Here’s a screenshot of that. If I move the file (the infected file) out of system32 the redirection stops. If I put it back in the infection is back. My question that is burning me is HOW did it get there? What put it there?
Process Monitor highlighting the search request for wdmaud.sysSo far, the infection is in c:windowssystem32wdmaud.sys (or c:winntsystem32wdmaud.sys). Simply delete the file and restart any open web browsers.
If you do not find the wdmaud.sys file, or are unsure what to even look for, you may download a tool that we created that will investigate all the files in the Windows system directory. It doesn’t just specifically look for the wdmaud.sys file, but it looks for the signature in every file within that directory.
Compatible with: Windows XP (all SPs), Server 2000/2003/2008, and Vista.
Your use of this software indicates that you agree to the attached terms of service.
[stextbox id="download" float="false" big="true"]Download Tool Here (EXE) (md5:74705f9d02ae429f6ca84662ac755621)[/stextbox]
Tool Update (1/16/2009)
* Prints path of file that is infected
* Allows program to accept a path as an argument; otherwise it uses %SystemDir% as default if no path specified
* Still no recursion -yet-
If you download the tool and find it useful, or don’t find it useful, I’d appreciate any feedback. You can leave a comment or send any questions/comments to rich@techish.net.